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Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez (2018)
describe two experiments on contextual control
over derived relational responding (DRR),
designed to investigate derived sameness and
opposition relations as described within Rela-
tional Frame Theory (RFT; Dymond & Roche,
2013; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001).
They argue that the outcomes of their experi-
ments suggest that all previous empirical dem-
onstrations of derived sameness and opposition
might be explained more parsimoniously in
terms of stimulus equivalence and exclusion.
In what follows, we address limitations in the
authors’ analysis and offer a rejoinder to their
thesis.
Their argument is first presented in a prior
study by Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez
(2017). In RFT-inspired studies into derived same
and opposite relations, two arbitrary stimuli (here-
after denoted SAME and OPPOSITE, respec-
tively) are first pretrained as cues for nonarbitrary
same and opposite responding (e.g., Dymond,
Roche, Forsyth, Whelan & Rhoden, 2007, 2008;
Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2004). This procedure
continues until participants select comparisons
identical to the samples given SAME, and compar-
isons the most physically dissimilar from the sam-
ples given OPPOSITE, in unreinforced testing.
Then, the participants are trained to form arbi-
trary stimulus relations in the presence of those
cues (e.g., SAME-A1B1, SAME-A1C1, OPPOSITE-
A1B2, OPPOSITE-A1C2) and tested for derived
relations (e.g., SAME-B1C1, SAME-B2C2,
OPPOSITE-B1C2, OPPOSITE-B2C1). In the case
of the examples just given, correct responding
would be taken as evidence for derivation of com-
binatorially entailed relations of same and
opposite. B1 and C1 should be responded to as
the same, as both are the same as A1. B2 and C2
should be derived as the same, as both are oppo-
site to A1 (i.e., combining two opposite relations
should yield a same relation). B1 and C2 should
be derived as opposites, as should C1 and B2,
because both cases involve combining a same and
an opposite relation (i.e., which always yields an
opposite relation).
Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez (2017)
argued that a pattern of responding such as this
might instead be explained in terms of equiva-
lence, nonequivalence and exclusion responding.
They suggest that “the cue for the selection of
comparisons identical to the samples (SAME)
could become a cue for selecting comparisons
equivalent to the samples” while the “cue for the
selection of comparisons the most dissimilar to
the samples (OPPOSITE) could become a cue
for the exclusion of comparisons equivalent to
the samples (i.e., nonequivalent comparisons)”
(p. 230). Following this, they argue that training
Same-A1B1 and Same-A1C1 could produce the
equivalence class A1B1C1, which would explain
the choice of C1 given B1 and vice versa, with
SAME as cue. In addition, training selection of
“B2 and C2 [given] A1 and OPPOSITE would
[make] B2 and C2 nonequivalent to A1”. Further,
because “B1 and C1 would be equivalent to A1,
then B2 and C2 would also be nonequivalent to
B1 and C1. Thus participants would [select] C1
[given] B2 and OPPOSITE because C1 and B2
[are] nonequivalent.” Likewise, they would select
C2 given B1 and OPPOSITE because C2 and B1
are equivalent. Finally, they would select “C2 given
B2 and SAME by the exclusion of C1. If C1
and B2 [are] nonequivalent, then C1 could
not [be] the correct choice [given] B2 and a
cue for equivalence (SAME). Thus, participants
[exclude] C1 and [select] C2” (p.231). They
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argue that this latter explanation is not under-
mined by the presence of a third comparison in
testing, because in the RFT procedure that they
critique, this comparison also appears in train-
ing, and its selection is never reinforced during
this stage. Hence, they argue, participants
might automatically exclude it during testing.
To back up their thesis, Alonso-Alvarez and
Perez-Gonzalez (2017) first trained college stu-
dents to respond in accordance with condi-
tional discriminations. Next, they trained them
to maintain this pattern given arbitrary stimu-
lus X1, and to reverse it given arbitrary stimu-
lus X2. Subsequently, they showed that X1 and
X2 appeared to control derived stimulus rela-
tions analogous to those controlled by Same
and Opposite cues in RFT experiments, such
as those cited above. They argued that this
could be explained by at least two hypotheses:
that X1 and X2 were cues for equivalence and
nonequivalence and responding by exclusion,
or that they functioned as cues for sameness
and opposition.
Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez (2018)
extend Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez
(2017) in two respects. In Experiment 1, they
provide evidence showing that X1 and X2
were functionally similar to Same and Oppo-
site cues in a wider array of tests of same and
opposite than used in Alonso-Alvarez and
Perez-Gonzalez (2017). In Experiment 2, they
aimed to further support the hypothesis that
X1 and X2 functioned as cues for equivalence
and nonequivalence and responding by exclu-
sion and not as Same and Opposite cues. They
used novel participants and established X1
and X2 as per Experiment 1. They then
showed that X1 and X2 could control
responding explicable in terms of equivalence,
nonequivalence and exclusion, but not in
terms of Same and Opposite control. Based
on their results, they argued that all previous
data reported as evidence of control by same
and opposite cues, can be now interpreted as
control by equivalence, nonequivalence and
exclusion.
In response, first, we would argue that the
Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez (2017,
2018) thesis is incompatible with data gener-
ated with research protocols that have not
employed their particular methodology. For
example, in Steele and Hayes (1991; Experi-
ment 2) participants were given training to
establish Same, Opposite and Different cues,
and were subsequently given test probes for all
three patterns of DRR. These included three
probes in which the sample (C1) and compari-
son stimuli (B1, B2 and N3) were the same
but in which only the contextual cue differed
and in which, given SAME, participants chose
B1, given DIFFERENT, they chose B2 and
given OPPOSITE, they chose N3. This out-
come thus exemplified three different pat-
terns of DRR and showed Different and
Opposite as two different patterns. Steele and
Hayes (1991, p.552) directly addressed the use
of the terms ‘equivalence and exclusion’ as a
potential explanation for their data as follows:
Many of the probe performances can be
explained on the basis of equivalence
and exclusion. Explaining Experiment
2 strictly in these terms is difficult
because three distinct patterns of perfor-
mance were shown. This seems at least to
require an appeal to higher order forms
of exclusion, in which stimuli selected by
virtue of exclusion in the presence of
DIFFERENT were themselves excluded
in the presence of OPPOSITE. Such an
analysis would be complicated but is
surely not impossible.Despite the fact
that Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez
reference the Steele and Hayes (1991)
paper, they make no mention of this
important aspect of Experiment 2.
Other more recent studies focusing on trans-
formation of functions through same and oppo-
site relations have also produced data that cannot
be explained in terms of equivalence, non-
equivalence and exclusion. Stewart et al. (2015)
first trained and tested participants such that dis-
criminative functions of selecting along an audi-
tory nonarbitrary dimension (i.e., selecting a
button producing one, two, or three electronic
‘peals’) were established in a small number of tex-
tual stimuli B2, X1 and X2. Participants were then
trained and tested for derived relations in accor-
dance with same and opposite between B2, X1
and X2 and several novel stimuli. Findings
showed that stimuli derived as the same as B2
(conditioned with one peal) always acquired the
nonarbitrary property of one peal (i.e., the same
property) while stimuli derived as being opposite
to B2 always acquired the property of three peals
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(i.e., as different as possible in this context from
one peal) rather than randomly acquiring prop-
erties of either two or three peals (either of which
is different from one peal). This outcome can
only be explained in terms of participants
responding in accordance with opposition rather
than distinction. As another example, Perez, de
Almeida and de Rose (2015) established a rela-
tional network in which stimuli C1 and C2 were,
respectively, similar and opposite to the facial
expression of happiness (A1). Using the Implicit
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP), they
showed that C2, opposite to happiness, was simi-
lar/equivalent to a sad expression (confirmed
using an explicit “happy-sad” scale). This transfor-
mation of function, in which the opposite of a
happy expression became similar to a sad expres-
sion, could not be explained by contextual con-
trol over equivalence and exclusion but suggests
that C2 andA1 were related by opposition.
Apart from this, several previous studies have
either established or strengthened opposition
relational responding as an operant response in
young children (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes & Smeets, 2004; Cassidy, Roche & Hayes,
2011; Hayes & Stewart, 2016). These trained per-
formances are always characterized by a pattern
in which the combination of an even number of
opposition relations results in a derived sameness
relation while the combination of an odd num-
ber of opposition relations results in a derived
opposition relation. This is a pattern that differs
from both sameness and difference and that can
be established without any reference to exclusion
relations. The fact that such a pattern can be
established under contextual control of a cue
such as the word ‘opposite’ is evidence of the
RFT argument that opposition relations are an
operant repertoire. Furthermore, the idea that
this and other relational repertoires are impor-
tant parts of the human verbal repertoire is fur-
ther bolstered by a more recent series of studies
which have shown the potential intellectual ben-
efit in children of establishing and strengthening
such relations. Cassidy, et al. (2011) were the first
to show that training multiple stimulus relations
including same, opposite, more and less could
significantly boost intellectual skills in children
and substantially beyond the level facilitated by
training equivalence relations alone. A more
recent study (Colbert, Tyndall, Roche & Cassidy,
2018) has provided evidence of the efficacy of
training same and opposite relations in particular
by showing that completion of the same and
opposite portion of the training protocol con-
ferred almost as much intellectual benefit as
completion of the protocol as a whole.
The studies described all employ methodolo-
gies that go beyond the approach discussed by
Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez (2018) and
demonstrate that a wider survey of the literature
undermines their general thesis. Even without
going beyond the research protocol on which
they focus, however, substantial arguments can
still be made that tend to undermine their claim.
Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez argue (based
on Experiment 1) that their conditional discrimi-
native training can establish stimuli with identical
functions to those seen following nonarbitrary
relational training as used in RFT studies. Fur-
thermore, they argue (based on Experiment 2)
that the function of these stimuli is equivalence
and nonequivalence (distinction) rather than
same and opposite. Several counterarguments
may be made here. First, as mentioned, one of
the key arguments underpinning the Alonso-
Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez thesis is that some
comparison stimuli that appear in tests of same
and opposite would be automatically excluded
by the participant because they had previously
appeared in training and choosing these stimuli
had never been reinforced. For example, they
argue that “the selection of C2 in the presence
of B2, with Same as contextual cue, could be
explained by the exclusion of C1, a comparison
nonequivalent to B2” (2018, p.214). This argu-
ment rests on the untested assumption that par-
ticipants will automatically reject a third stimulus
that also appears in this trial type if it had previ-
ously appeared in training and choosing it had
never been reinforced. By extension, the same
argument could potentially apply to cases involv-
ing additional comparisons also. However, the
suggestion is not based on empirical evidence.
Another counterargument begins by observing
that both conditional discrimination training
and RFT-style nonarbitrary relational training are
potentially capable of producing derived same
and opposite relations. Perhaps the RFT protocol
is more likely to do so than the alternative proto-
col, but this is an empirical matter. In addition, it
is also possible that stimuli established using
either method could potentially control both
same and opposite as well as a pattern more simi-
lar to that suggested by Alonso-Alvarez and
Perez-Gonzalez (2018) within the same experi-
ment, depending on the training and testing
contexts. For example, as discussed, the Alonso-
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Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez training phase may
have cued same and opposite responding for at
least some participants. However, the researchers
deliberately designed particular test trials to rule
out the possibility of continuing to respond
based on same and opposite. From an RFT point
of view, humans have a prolonged history of
DRR in which relational coherence is reinforced
and incoherence punished (e.g., Wray, Dougher,
Hamilton & Guinther, 2012). Thus, people try to
respond as coherently as possible within and
across contexts. Hence, a participant who
had previously responded solely based on same
and opposite might now, in the context of
these trial-types, attempt to exclude one or more
alternatives based on some additional rule
(e.g., exclude stimuli the choice of which has
never previously been reinforced). This outcome
could certainly have happened in the Alonso-
Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez study. However, to
more properly test such hypotheses within their
methodological approach, further experimenta-
tion would be helpful.
In addition to challenging the concept of same
and opposite contextual control, Alonso-Alvarez
and Perez-Gonzalez (2018) claim that their data
might also undermine the RFT argument in favor
of multiple stimulus relations more broadly. They
argue that if, as they claim, relational responding
is never truly under the control of same and oppo-
site cues, perhaps the same might be the case for
other forms of nonequivalent relations, such as
more/less relations. Notwithstanding the consid-
erable weaknesses in the first claim regarding
same and opposite, such arguments should not be
applied to other forms of relational responding in
the absence of a full unpacking of the argument
and ideally empirical evidence of the ability to gen-
erate complex “apparent” DRR in accordance
with multiple relations and attendant forms of
stimulus function transformation (e.g., Dougher,
Hamilton, Fink, & Harrington, 2007; Dymond &
Barnes, 1995, 1996; Hoon, Bickford, Samuels, &
Dymond, 2019; Hughes et al., 2018; May, Stewart,
Baez, Freegard & Dymond, 2017; McLoughlin &
Stewart, 2017; Munnelly, Stewart, & Dymond,
2019; O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets,
2004; O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes & Stewart, 2014;
Slattery & Stewart, 2014; Stewart, Slattery, Cham-
bers & Dymond, 2018; Whelan, Barnes-Holmes, &
Dymond, 2006).
In conclusion, Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-
Gonzalez’s (2018) claim that all previous empiri-
cal demonstrations of derived same and opposite
might be explained more parsimoniously in
terms of stimulus equivalence and exclusion has
several technical and conceptual weaknesses. We
have suggested several projects that might help
test their thesis more rigorously as well as push-
ing forward research on DRR and stimulus con-
trol. These include examining transformation of
function of stimuli using a protocol such as the
IRAP to test whether the stimuli do indeed par-
ticipate in derived relations of same and opposite
(Perez et al., 2015); investigating the extent to
which participants will automatically reject a stim-
ulus in testing if it has previously appeared in
training, but choosing it has never been
reinforced; and investigating whether partici-
pants induced to respond in accordance with
both same and opposite might also subsequently
respond in accordance with exclusion if the con-
text appeared to require it. Despite the fact that
we disagree with their conclusions, we welcome
Alonso-Alvarez and Perez-Gonzalez’s emphasis
on studying derived relations other than stimulus
equivalence, which we hope will stimulate further
basic and applied research.
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